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Abstract
Allocating multiple scarce items across a set of individuals is an important practical
problem. In the case of divisible goods and additive preferences a convex program
can be used to find the solution that maximizes Nash welfare (MNW). The MNW
solution is equivalent to finding the equilibrium of a market economy (aka. the
competitive equilibrium from equal incomes, CEEI) and thus has good properties
such as Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and incentive compatibility in the large.
Unfortunately, this equivalence (and nice properties) breaks down for general
preference classes. Motivated by real world problems such as course allocation
and recommender systems we study the case of additive ‘at most one’ (AMO)
preferences - individuals want at most 1 of each item and lotteries are allowed. We
show that in this case the MNW solution is still a convex program and importantly
is a CEEI solution when the instance gets large but has a ‘low rank’ structure.
Thus a polynomial time algorithm can be used to scale CEEI (which is in general
PPAD-hard) for AMO preferences. We examine whether the properties guaranteed
in the limit hold approximately in finite samples using several real datasets.
1 Introduction
Many important practical problems involve distributing a finite set of items across a set of individuals
in a ‘good’ way. While the exact definition of ‘good’ is hotly debated, typically there are several
desiderata: the allocation should be efficient in some way, should be fair in some way, and should
have good incentive properties for the individuals (Brams and Taylor, 1996; Roth, 2015; Brandt
et al., 2016; Milgrom and Milgrom, 2004). In this paper we study allocation in an environment
where preferences are additive, individuals want at most one of any given item, monetary transfers
are not possible, and lotteries are allowed. Examples of such assignment problems in practice are
course assignment at universities (Budish and Cantillon, 2012), pilot-to-plane assignment for airlines,
dividing up estates (Goldman and Procaccia, 2014), and recommender systems for scarce goods. We
show that when instances are large and ‘low rank’ we can construct a strategy-proof mechanism that
generates Pareto Optimal and envy-free allocations. This mechanism requires only solving a convex
program (potentially via gradient methods) so it is scalable to extremely large assignment problems.
All item assignment mechanisms must trade off between total utility attained and various measures of
fairness of the division. One distributionally fair allocation is the one which maximizes the product
of the utilities (or the sum of the log utilities). This is called max Nash welfare (MNW Nash (1953);
Binmore et al. (1986)). MNW has many other nice properties leading researchers to refer to MNW as
an ‘unreasonably fair’ allocation method (Caragiannis et al., 2016). MNW is employed at spliddit.org
which allows individuals to fairly split items such as estates (Goldman and Procaccia, 2014).
Another popular assignment method is competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI Varian
(1974); Budish (2011)). In CEEI individuals are given a budget of faux currency and prices for items
are computed such that the total demand for each item (given the budgets) equals the supply. Because
CEEI is based on a market equilibrium, we know that CEEI allocations will be Pareto efficient
(nobody can be made better off without making someone worse off), envy-free (nobody prefers
anyone else’s allocation), and strategy-proof in the large (when individuals report their preferences
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to the CEEI mechanism, they have no incentive to lie). Due to these attractive properties CEEI is
employed in the CourseMatch system which is used to assign course slots to individuals at universities
(Budish et al., 2016). A downside of the CEEI mechanism is that solving for market equilibrium with
general preferences is extremely difficult and even in relatively small instances the CourseMatch
system needs to “use heuristic search that solves billions of Mixed-Integer Programs to output an
approximate competitive equilibrium.” (Budish et al., 2016). Indeed, computation of approximate
CEEI in general is known to be PPAD hard (Othman et al., 2016).
A surprising coincidence occurs when items are divisible and preferences are additive. Here the
MNW solution can be found by solving a convex optimization problem and the MNW allocations
happens to coincide with a CEEI allocation (Eisenberg and Gale, 1959). This program is often called
the Eisenberg-Gale (EG) convex program. This means that MNW solutions inherit the desirable
properties above, and also that a CEEI can be computed extremely efficiently.
However, even if there is no complementarity between items the linear allocation rule is restrictive.
For example, in the case of course allocation we do not want to assign an individual 5.6 seats in a
course. Thus, in this paper we consider the problem of at most one (AMO) preferences. We assume
that preferences for items are additive but that individuals do not desire more than one of an item.1
We also assume that lotteries are allowed and so item allocations are now real numbers between 0
and 1.
Our main theoretical contribution is to show that when the underlying valuations have a low-rank
structure and the instance is large the convex program corresponding to AMO-MNW maximization
also yields an allocation which is an approximate CEEI. This can be interpreted either as saying that
large scale AMO-MNW has the good properties of CEEI or that approximate large scale linear-AMO-
CEEI can be computed in polynomial time.
We then investigate whether good properties of large scale, low-rank AMO-MNW hold in real
datasets. We consider two markets, one for course allocation at Harvard Business School (Budish
and Cantillon, 2012) and one using a recommender system (Harper and Konstan, 2016). We show
that in these markets AMO-MNW produces good solutions at a great speedup over standard CEEI
implementations. Finally, we investigate incentive properties of AMO-MNW by using Bayesian
Optimization to search for profitable deviations from truthful revelation. We find that in AMO-MNW
deviations are fairly difficult to find and even when found produce only marginal improvements over
truthful revelations.
2 Related Work
There is a large literature on computing market equilibria in Fisher markets using convex programming
(Eisenberg and Gale, 1959; Shmyrev, 2009; Cole et al., 2017) or gradient-based methods (Birnbaum
et al., 2011; Nesterov and Shikhman, 2018). There is also work extending the EG program to new
settings such as quasi-linear utilities and indivisible items (Cole et al., 2017; Cole and Gkatzelis,
2018; Caragiannis et al., 2016). Our paper complements this existing work as we extend the EG
program to the case of AMO preferences and show that when markets are large and low rank this
again continues to construct a market equilibrium allocation.
An important real world usage of multi-item allocation is online advertising where ad slots are
assigned to individuals via an auction mechanism. This problem is known to be hard in large multi-
unit, multi-bidder cases especially with budgets (Borgs et al., 2005). It is also known that there is
an equivalence between paced dynamic auctions and the equilibria resulting from solving the EG
problem (Conitzer et al., 2019). Our paper shows that EG equilibrium can be used as a flexible tool
for such allocation problems with AMO preferences. Note that our results here are for the ‘fake
money’ setting but they can be extended to the case where money is real (aka. quasi-linear settings)
easily (Cole et al., 2017).
1For ease of notation we consider individuals only wanting at most one of each item, but most of our results
carry over to the case where ‘buyer capacity constraints’ hold across items - for example there may be 10
different brands of vacuum cleaners which individuals may value differently, however still want at most K
vacuum cleaners total. In the Appendix we describe this in more detail but keep the AMO constraint in the main
text for ease of exposition.
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3 Theory
We consider the setting of N individuals with generic element i and M items with generic element
j. Each item has a finite supply sj with smax being the maximum supply of an item. Individual i
has utility vij for item j. We let x denote an N ×M matrix which we call the allocation of items to
individuals with xi denoting a vector of how much of each item individual i receives.
The main question is what is a good x to use. One answer given by the literature is to maximize the
product of utilities - equivalently, the sum of the log utilities. This is known as the max Nash welfare
(MNW) solution. It is the solution to the following constrained optimization problem:
max
x≥0
∑
i
log(ui(xi)) s.t. ∀j
∑
i
xij ≤ sj
When items are divisible and utilities are linear (i.e. when ui(xi) = xivi =
∑
j xijvij) the problem
above is a convex program known as the Eisenberg-Gale (EG) convex program and can be solved
efficiently (Eisenberg and Gale, 1959).
Surprisingly, the EG program has an economic interpretation. Starting with the setup above we can
consider the case where each individual is given a budget of 1 unit of faux-currency. Each item is
assigned a price pj and given these prices we define:
Definition 1. Buyer i’s demand is the set of utility maximizing allocations
Di(p) = {xi | vixi ≥ vix′i∀x′i and xij ≤ sj}.
Note that demand may be set valued but all xi ∈ Di(p) achieve the same utility level. We let this be
U¯i(p).
Definition 2. An allocation, price pair (x∗, p∗) is a market equilibrium if supply meets demand:
1. x∗i ∈ Di(p∗) for all buyers i
2.
∑
i x
∗
ij = sj for all items j
A deep connection between the convex program above and the concept of market equilibrium comes
from the following equivalence. Solve the convex program and let xEG be the solution. Let λEG be
the M Lagrange multipliers at the optimum (one per item). It can be shown that (xEG, λEG) form a
market equilibrium.
This connection tells us a lot about properties of the EG solution. We know that any CEEI is envy-free
(no individual prefers another’s bundle to their own), is Pareto Optimal (nobody can be made better
without someone else being made worse off). In addition, market equilibrium can be used as an
allocative mechanism - individuals are asked to report their valuations, an equilibrium is computed,
and the resulting allocation is enacted. This mechanism is incentive compatible in the large - i.e.
when markets get large, no individual has an incentive to lie about their true preferences.
3.1 At Most One EG
The simple EG solution above is not applicable to many real world problems. This is for two reasons,
first, many real world goods are indivisible. However, a fractional allocation can always be thought
of as a lottery and resolved at the end of the mechanism. A bigger issue is that in many real world
applications such as course allocation, recommender systems, or advertising slots the individuals do
not want more than 1 of any single item. We refer to this as the at most one (AMO) setting.
We can rewrite our slate constrained problem (which we refer to as the AMO Eisenberg-Gale or
AMO-EG) as:
max
x≥0
∑
i
log(xivi) s.t. ∀j
∑
i
xij ≤ sj and xij ≤ 1
Unfortunately, the solution to the AMO-EG program no longer has the nice properties of the original
EG (although given that it is a maximization problem the resulting allocation remains Pareto optimal).
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To see this, consider the example of 2 individuals and 2 items. There is supply 2 of item 1 and supply
1 of item 2. Both value item 1 at 1, individual 1 values item 2 at 1 and individual 2 values it at 100.
In the AMO-EG solution here both individuals get 1 of item 1 due to the constraint and split item
2. However, individual 2 receives more of item 2 than individual 1, thus individual 1 must envy
individual 2. Since the solution exhibits envy, it cannot be a CEEI solution.2
To see where the original EG and CEEI equivalence breaks down, notice that unlike the standard EG
problem, the AMO-EG problem now has constraints both at the item level (M supply constraints
which we refer to as λAMO) and the buyer-item level (N×M AMO constraints). Due to the presence
of buyer-item specific multipliers the M supply-Lagrange multipliers at the optimum may no longer
be thought of as prices supporting the solution xAMO.
However, we now give a condition for when they approximately support xAMO as an equilibrium
allocation.
Definition 3. Let (x∗, p∗) be an allocation, price pair. We say it is a δ-approximate CEEI if for all
buyers i we have
vi · x∗i + δ ≥ U¯i(p∗).
In other words, that x∗i is approximately a demand vector for buyer i under the prices.
We show that when every buyer has a sufficiently-large set of “twins” then they receive approximate
demands in AMO-EG. Note that in the AMO setting buyers must take into account the AMO
constraint when computing demands.
Theorem 1. Individual i and j are -twins if ||vi − vj ||∞ ≤ . For any δ > 0 there exists  > 0 such
that if everyone has smax + 1 -twins, then (xAMO, λAMO) is a δ-approximate CEEI.
The Theorem here is written that for any δ there exists an . In fact, we can derive a much stronger
result: given an instantiation of individuals, items, valuations, supplies, and budgets, we can explicitly
bound how δ-approximate of a CEEI the AMO-EG solution is by considering the largest  such that
each individual has an  twin. This bound is quite complex and requires the introduction of a lot of
notation, thus we relegate it to the Appendix. In addition, this bound lets us derive a weaker, but
harder to interpret condition for δ-approximate CEEI which implies the one in Theorem 1 above. We
provide a more general theorem which implies Theorem 1 in the Appendix.
Here we give a sketch of the intuition for Theorem 1. First, recall that the Lagrange multipliers of
a convex program measure the shadow value of locally relaxing a constraint. Consider a group of
smax + 1 exact twins with identical valuation functions. In any allocation the AMO constraints for
some item j bind for at most smax of them. However, the last twin, by assumption, is unconstrained.
This means that for that item j the AMO Lagrange multipliers are 0 at xAMO since the last twin
is unconstrained and all twins contribute equally to the convex program’s objective. It can then be
shown, just as in the standard EG program, that the remaining non-zero Lagrange multipliers (the M
supply constraints) can again be thought of as prices. Looking at approximate instead of exact twins
is slightly more complex but follows a related logic.
Approximate CEEI is attractive because it approximately retains the nice properties of CEEI. When
receiving an item in their demand, a given individual i has no envy (since they can afford any bundle
received by some other individual) and receives their proportional share (since prices sum to less than
N ). It follows that in δ-approximate CEEI every individual has at most δ envy, and receives all but δ
of their proportional share.
3.2 Low Rank Markets
We now ask: under what generating process for a large market is the approximate twin condition
satisfied?
We propose a simple market generating process that is a model of many real world markets. We look
at low rank markets where every individual i has a latent vector θi drawn from some set Θ which is
a compact subset of Rd+. Every item has a vector ψ from some set Ψ which is also some compact
subset of Rd+ with d fixed. The supply of each item is some constant s > 1. The valuation of an
individual is vij = θi · ψj . This states that item valuations are not independent and valuation of one
2Thanks to Nisarg Shah for providing this example.
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item can be at least partially predicted from valuations of other items. This is true in most real world
recommendation settings and is exploited in most recommender systems.
Consider growing a low rank market by drawing N individuals from some continuous distribution on
Θ and drawing kN items from Ψ.
Theorem 2. For any , δ > 0 there exists N¯ such that ifN > N¯ the probability that (xAMO, λAMO)
is an δ-approximate CEEI is greater than 1− δ.
Thus, in large, low-rank markets AMO-EG is a convex program that finds an approximate CEEI.
Low rank markets are a natural model under which our approximate-twin conditions are satisfies.
However, there are also many other market models one could construct where these same conditions
hold. A commonly used example is replicator markets, where we start with some finite base economy,
and the market grows by replicating the set of individuals and items. Here every individual gets k
exact twins, where k is the number of market replicates. Assuming that the AMO constraint is local
to each market replicate this immediately implies the condition of Theorem 1.
3.3 Strategy Proofness for AMO-EG
An important part of any mechanism is individuals reporting their valuations. If reporting truthfully
yields a higher utility than lying a mechanism is known as strategy proof. While CEEI is not strategy
proof in general, it is known that it becomes strategy proof in the large (SP-L).
We now extend some known results (Azevedo and Budish, 2018; Peysakhovich and Kroer, 2019) to
our setting to show that AMO-EG is SP-L in low rank markets. Note that the low rank model differs
from the results in Azevedo and Budish (2018) as it assumes an infinite number of outcomes (since
allocations are continuous). It also differs from the related SP-L results in Peysakhovich and Kroer
(2019) as it assumes a growing number of items.
We consider the definition of SP-L introduced by Azevedo and Budish (2018) and used in
Peysakhovich and Kroer (2019). Let σ be a mapping (not necessarily truthful) from valuations
to reports. Suppose that σ has full range (i.e. for any report, there is a type that gives that report with
some probability). Consider an individual i who can either report their true valuations vi or some
other valuation v′i with everyone else reporting according to σ. Consider i’s expected utility with the
expectation taken relative to the n− 1 other individuals behaving according to σ with their true types
drawn from F .
Definition 4. A mechanism is SP-L if, given σ and any  > 0 there exists a N¯ such that if N > N¯
then the gain from reporting any v′i instead of their true valuation vi gains is at most .
Theorem 3. The AMO-EG mechanism is SP-L for low-rank markets.
3.4 Generality of these Results
In the prior section we have shown results for AMO-EG. We have done this for ease of exposition and
because the at-most-one constraint seems reasonable for many practical applications. Importantly,
however, our result generalize to a more general market model. In the Appendix we prove the EG,
market equilibrium equivalence for a more general model where items are partitioned into item-sets
and individuals want at most one item from each item set (for example, in the case of household
items there may be multiple vacuum cleaner brands but individuals may still only want one vacuum
cleaner). The more general model also allows arbitrary budgets. AMO is a special case where each
item set includes just a single item, and CEEI is a special case where all budgets are 1. For the paper,
we stick to the simpler AMO model as it is easier to discuss and gain intuition about.
4 Experiments
4.1 Datasets
We consider two datasets of allocation preferences. First, we use a synthetic market from a recom-
mender system as used in (Kroer et al., 2019; Peysakhovich and Kroer, 2019). To construct this
market we take the MovieLens1M dataset in which 6000 users rate subsets of 4000 movies. We use
the same procedure/hyperparamters from Kroer et al. (2019) to construct estimates for unobserved
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user/movie pairs. We then take the top 200 users with the most ratings and the top 1000 movies
with the most ratings and construct markets from this subset. We consider a growing set of markets
by taking {50, 100, 200, 500, 1000} items and holding the number of buyers fixed. We set the sum
of supplies to be in {500, 1000, 2000}. This procedure gives us 15 nested markets that grow as the
conditions of Theorem 1 suggest.
We also consider an allocation dataset from course allocation at Harvard Business school (Budish and
Cantillon, 2012). In this dataset there are 936 students and 93 courses with fixed supplies. Students
rank their top 30 courses. To transform these ranks into utilities we assume that a rank r course gives
utility 31−r30 and courses that receive no ranking have utility 0 (recall that MNW is invariant to the
scale of individual utilities so normalizing the top ranked course to have utility 1 has no effect on our
computation). Note that this dataset is not like the limit markets considered in Theorem 1 as it has
many buyers and relatively few items.
4.2 AMO-EG Allocations
We now turn to evaluating AMO-EG in our data. We solve for the equilibrium using a commercial
convex programming solver that supports maximizing logarithmic utilities (MOSEK 9 (Dahl and
Andersen, 2019)), though at larger scales (e.g. millions) we would need to use a first-order method.
We refer the reader to Kroer et al. (2019) for specialized techniques for solving extremely large scale
EG problems which are directly generalizable to our AMO-EG setting.
As a first cut, we will compare the EG solution to the AMO-EG solution. In particular, we will see
how often the standard EG violates the AMO constraint. If EG solutions do not violate the AMO
constraint then AMO-EG is trivially a market equilibrium and indeed can be used out of the box
without our modifications. However, figure 1 shows us this is not the case in any of our datasets. We
count both the number of individuals that receive more than one of an item (number of violators) and
the amount of items they receive conditional on receiving more than one (violation size).
The naive EG solution allocates almost every buyer in the MovieLens markets more than one of
an item and often large multiples. In the course data (right panel) we see that EG allocates some
individuals as many as 19 seats in a course. Thus, naive EG ignoring the AMO constraints yields
poor solutions for AMO preferences and thus the AMO-EG program is needed.
# Violators Avg Violation Size
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Figure 1: Standard EG using linear preferences allocates multiple copies of items to individuals in all
of our markets thus is not appropriate for AMO settings. In all markets almost every buyer ends up
with an extreme allocation of more than one item.
4.3 Computational Improvements
One advantage of the AMO-EG procedure is that it is a result of a convex optimization prob-
lem. An approximate version of CEEI (aCEEI) is used in practice to match individuals to courses
at leading business schools - the algorithm used for this task is known as CourseMatch (see
https://mba-inside.wharton.upenn.edu/course-match/ for a student-facing tutorial of the
mechanism).
The algorithm underlying it is described in Budish et al. (2016). Budish (2011) uses the same course
data we do and describes the performance of the aCEEI algorithm as: “the Othman et al. (2010)
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computational procedure can solve problems ... 50 courses and schedules...in around 20 minutes
in Matlab on a standard workstation. It can solve problems the size of a full year at HBS, in which
there are roughly 100 courses and schedules....in around 11 hours in a more sophisticated computing
environment.” By contrast the AMO-EG solution on a full year of HBS data can be computed using
an industrial grade solver (MOSEK) on a commodity laptop in approximately 15 seconds.3
4.4 Use of Lotteries
In order to make the allocation space well behaved, AMO-EG uses continuous allocations. Since
we use AMO preferences, these can be thought of as lotteries over pure allocations. An important
question is whether this convexification leads to very random allocations (many xij ∈ (0, 1)) or
whether the resulting allocations are mostly pure. We plot these for all of our markets in Figure 2 and
see that AMO-EG allocations are mostly pure in practice.
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ML 1000 Items 1000 Supply ML 1000 Items 2000 Supply ML 200 Items 1000 Supply ML 200 Items 2000 Supply
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Figure 2: Though AMO-EG is allowed to use continuous allocations (lotteries) we see that the
resulting allocations are mostly pure across all of our markets. Density plots show density of
allocations removing all allocations that are less than .0001 (these result from numerical accuracy
being on the order of 1e− 5).
4.5 Envy and Regret
We now ask whether the AMO-EG has good properties. We start by considering envy and regret.
First, we define envy for the AMO-EG solution. Let xAMO be the AMO-EG allocation. We compute
the envy of individual i as
max
i′∈N
vi(x
AMO
i′ − xAMOi ).
Our measure of envy will be this averaged across all individuals. Equilibria are envy-free (and indeed
envy-freeness is an important reason why CEEI is a compelling mechanism) so this is one measure
of finite sample performance.
Recall that the EG convex program yielded an equilibrium by using the Lagrange multipliers for
the supply constraints at the optimum as the prices that supported its allocation. AMO-EG also
has Lagrange multipliers for these constraints (in addition to extra multipliers for each of the AMO
constraints). We now ask whether the supply-constraint Lagrange multipliers can be interpreted
as equilibrium prices. We refer to these at the optimum as pAMO. We will take pAMO and for
each individual compute their demand Di(pAMO). Recall that the demand may be a set but that all
possible allocations in the demand must yield the same utility level. We refer to this as u¯i(pAMO).
We will compute the normalized regret of an individual i facing these prices:
3Of course, aCEEI allows for more general preferences over bundles than our simple additive ones. However
existing benchmarks for aCEEI such as Budish (2011) already make the assumption that “(A1) preferences are
additively-separable; and (A2) students care about the average rank of the courses they receive”, moreover the
same author reports that “preliminary exploration of preferences more complex than average-rank suggest that
all of the reported results are robust” so actually the linearity assumption is both commonly used and not as
serious as it may seem.
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PriceRegreti(x
AMO, pAMO) =
u¯(pAMO − vixAMOi )
u¯(pAMO)
.
If an individual i’s regret is 0, it means that xAMOi ∈ Di(pAMO). Note that this is an upper bound
on regret, there may exist prices which have lower expected regret for the AMO allocation.
We find that AMO-EG has basically no envy in any of the markets we study (Figure 3). By contrast
we see that the Price Regret of AMO-EG goes away as markets grow in the fashion required by our
theory. How important price regret is from a practical point of view is an open question since even in
the CEEI mechanism the currency and prices are ‘fake’. Nevertheless, it is one possible measure of
how close AMO-EG is to a market equilibrium and perhaps useful in a hybrid mechanism where the
mechanism only sets prices and individuals are allowed to buy items as they wish.
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Figure 3: AMO-EG yields no envy (up to numerical precision) in all of our markets. When we
grow the MovieLens market as our Theorem requires (more items than buyers) we see that Lagrange
multipliers from the AMO-EG program can be used as market equilibrium prices. On the other
hand in the course allocation problem the prices implied by the Lagrange multipliers are not market
clearing prices for the AMO-EG allocation yielding an average of a 20% regret.
4.6 Incentive Compatibility
Market EG LRD Found AMO-EG LRD Found EG LRD Gain AMO-EG LRD Gain
MovieLens (Worst) .12 (.05) .16 (.05) .007 (.01) .025 (.02)
MovieLens (Best) .20 (.05) .22 (.06) .00005 (.0001) .02 (.02)
Courses .26 (.06) .05 (.03) .00001 (.0001) .04 (.03)
Table 1: Low rank deviations (LRD) are difficult to find in both AMO-EG and EG. However, we see
that even when they are found, LRD lead to only small increases in attained utility for the deviating
agents - reported gains are percent increases in utility relative to truthful revelation.
Finally, an important practical reason for the use of CEEI is that it is incentive compatible. However,
this property is only guaranteed as the market becomes large. We ask how incentive compatible
AMO-EG is in our datasets. In particular, we will ask how much individuals can gain by misreporting
their preferences given the fixed valuations of all other individuals. We will compare this to the ability
of individuals to deviate in the EG using the same valuation matrix without the AMO constraints.
Ideally, we would like to solve the following problem for each individual. Let (v′i, v−i) denote a
vector of reports for individual i (v′i) and for everyone else (v−i). Let x
AMO(v′i, v−i) denote the
AMO-EG allocation from these reports. Suppose each individual i has true valuation vi. We would
like to measure how much they can gain from reporting non-truthfully. However, computing this
quantity is difficult in practice since it requires computing the optimal deviation.
Since we are not guaranteed convexity of the deviation function, we need to perform a global search.
The simplest solution is to discretize the type space and construct a grid-search. However, in high
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dimensions this quickly becomes intractable. An alternative is to use Bayesian Optimization (BO)
techniques which allow for sample efficient exploration of a parameter space (Shahriari et al., 2015).
Standard BO works as follows: given a space Θ of possible parameters, we want to maximize a
function f(θ). We sample K points θ from Θ and fit a Gaussian Process (GP) model to the observed
values f(θ). GPs give a posterior mean and uncertainty associated with any point θ in parameter
space, so we can use the model uncertainty to search for an optimal next point to sample. We sample
this next point, update the model and repeat. A full description of the details involved in each of
the steps above is beyond this paper and a large literature addresses many common usecases. For
the purposes of this paper we use an open source BO optimization platform deployed at industrial
scale (e.g. at facebook) called Adaptive Experiment (Ax, (Bakshy et al., [n. d.])). Ax is a high level
abstraction for BoTorch (https://github.com/pytorch/botorch) which is itself an extension
of the deep learning framework PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017). We use the standard Ax’s service API
to construct the optimization procedure as detailed in the Ax tutorial here: https://ax.dev/. We
use 50 trials per run with 3 random restarts per person.
Unfortunately, even with the sample efficient exploration strategy given by BO, our parameter space
is intractably large (a valuation for each item). We reduce the parameter space by exploiting the
fact that in our data valuations for items are correlated and thus the full valuation matrix can be
approximated by a lower rank matrix quite well. The valuation matrix V can be well approximated
by the matrix product V ∼ BKt where B is an N × d matrix of vectors for individuals and K is an
M × d matrix of vectors for items so vij can be well approximated by bikj . We consider deviations
by individuals only across these principal directions of variation that are fixed by the matrix K.
We allow deviations where individuals choose bi from a compact subset of Rd which then gives us a
full deviation vector of the form v′ij = vij + bi · kj . Here choosing 0d corresponds to truth telling.
We refer to these as low-rank deviations.
If d < M then we have reduced the size of the parameter space that we need to search. In practice
we will use d = 10. We justify the focus on low rank deviations by the fact that in many large scale
systems (e.g. recommender systems, online advertising) it is infeasible to report a full vector of
valuations. In practice such systems have missing valuations which are filled in by assuming a low
rank structure and using matrix completion. Since an individual i is small relative to the market
changing their report won’t change the found latent space so indeed they can only deviate in the low
rank space.
Even with these heavy restrictions, the optimization process is quite computationally expensive as it
requires solving for the AMO-EG/EG equilibrium at each time step. We consider three instances: the
‘worst case’ MovieLens marker (200 buyers, 50 items, total supply 2000), the ‘best case’ MovieLens
market (200 buyers, 1000 items, total supply 2000) and the HBS course market.
In each replicate we sample an individual from the market, hold the others fixed, and use BO as
described above to try to find a low rank deviation which increases that individual’s utility. We repeat
this for 49 individuals from each market. We see that finding low rank deviations (LRDs) is quite
difficult (Table 4.6) - only about 5 to 20% of the time does BO find any deviation from truthtelling
and even when it does the gains are no more than 5 percent of the baseline utility.
This analysis provides no guarantee that bigger deviations do not exist. Indeed, perhaps profitable
deviations exist in the cut off parts of the spectrum or perhaps BO is not a good optimizing technique
to find them. We also tried using standard zeroth order methods provided with SciPy (Jones et al.,
2001). We found these to perform even worse both with initialization at truthtelling and with random
restarts. In addition, we tried looking for low rank deviations in a different mechanism: one which
inputs valuations and outputs the social efficiency (sum of utilities) maximizing allocation. Here
there is an obvious profitable deviation - report high values for all items and receive all of them. We
found that in this setting BO easily found optimal low rank deviations. Developing better methods for
computing the incentive compatibility of a particular instance is an important topic for future work.
5 Conclusion
The multi-unit assignment problem is heavily studied both in theory and in practice. We have shown
that a convex program can be used to efficiently apply the CEEI mechanism in the case of linear,
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at-most-one preferences with divisible goods (or lotteries). This is a natural preference class for many
real world allocation problems and our results allow CEEI to scale to very large assignment tasks.
Many open questions remain: can we incorporate substitutes and complements into the CEEI
mechanism in a tractable way? What other preference classes allow for simple scalable solutions to
the CEEI problem? How can we take advantage of the special structure of the EG convex program to
solve it more efficiently for large low-rank markets?
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A Eisenberg-Gale for Constraint Groups
We will describe our results for a more general model than the AMO model used in the main body of
the paper. Instead we will assume that we have a set K of constraint groups which is a partitioning of
items. Thus each k ∈ K is a subset of the original items. We assume that each buyer can be assigned
at most 1 unit of items among those in the group k. This nests AMO preferences by letting k be
singletons. Furthermore, we allow general non-equal budgets rather than assuming that all budgets
are equal as in the main text (equal budgets is equivalent to assuming that all budgets are 1).
The model we wish to solve is the following
maxx
∑
iBi log(vi · xi)
s.t.
∑
i xi ≤ s∑
j∈k xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ K
x ≥ 0
(1)
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Writing the Lagrangian we get
min
p,λ≥0
max
x≥0
∑
i
Bi log(vi · xi)−
∑
j
pj
(∑
i
xi − 1
)
−
∑
i,k
λik
∑
j∈k
xij − 1
 (2)
Let βi = Bivi·xi be the utility price of buyer i. The first-order optimality condition wrt. xij gives
vijβi − pj − λik ≤ 0⇒ vijβi ≤ pj + λik (3)
Furthermore, if xij > 0 we have
vijβi = pj + λik, (4)
which shows that if xij > 0 then the utility price
pj+λik
vij
is tied for best among all items.
Multiplying each equation in (4) by xij and summing over j gives∑
j
xij(pj + λik) =
∑
j
xijvij
Bi
vi · xi = Bi (5)
If not for λik, this would show that each buyer is spending their entire budget under prices p. Coupled
with (4) this shows that the entire budget is spent on optimal items, and thus each buyer is receiving a
bundle from their demand. Thus when λ = 0 we get a market equilibrium. However, when λik > 0
for some i, k we no longer get a market equilibrium under prices p because the buyer is spending
less than their budget. If we allow additional personalized prices for each group then we could set
those equal to λik and we would get a form of “market equilibrium with personalized prices” under
p, λ. But such a market equilibrium concept with personalized prices does not seem particularly
compelling. Instead, we will show that for an appropriate, and practical, notion of “large” markets
each λik becomes small as the market size increases. Thus we will show that our variant of the
Eisenberg-Gale convex program gives an approximate market equilibrium for large markets, where
the approximation error is negligible for sufficiently-large markets.
Our result will be based on a structure satisfied by large markets: each buyer has an increasingly-large
set of approximate “twins,” meaning buyers with approximately the same valuation. Our theorem
will show that for each buyer i, as long as some approximate twin is unconstrained for constraint
group k, then λik is approximately zero. The following is our main theorem
Theorem 4 (Approximate twins give bounded AMO prices). Let (x, p, λ) be a solution to (2). For
any buyer i and constraint group k such that λik > 0, let i′ be another buyer such that |βi−βi′ | ≤ β ,
and
∑
j∈k xi′j < 1. Let jk ∈ k be such that xijk > 0 and |vijk − vi′jk | ≤ kv . Then we can bound
the value of λik as follows
λik ≤ βvijk + βi′kv
Proof. Applying (3) for i′ and noting that λi′k, along with the bounds kv , β , gives
pj ≥ βi′vi′jk ≥ βi′(vijk − kv) ≥ (βi − β)vijk − βi′kv = βivijk − βvijk − βi′kv
Now we can apply (4) for buyer i and apply our bound on pjk to show the theorem
vijkβi = pjk + λik ≥ βivijk − βvijk − βi′kv + λik
⇔λik ≤ βvijk + βi′kv
If every buyer, constraint group pair i, k has an associated unconstrained approximate twin then
Theorem 4 allows us to bound the error in several of the properties that are usually guaranteed by EG,
as well as by CEEI and market equilibrium in general.
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A.1 Helper lemmas
In order to show when Theorem 4 gives useful bounds we will need upper and lower bounds on
several basic quantities suchs as prices, utilities, and utility-prices. For most of the lemmas in this
section, the point is that we need some upper and lower bound on the quantity in question, such that
the bound does not increase with market size. Thus we can in turn use these lemmas in later sections
where ratios such as maxij vijminij vij or
∑
i Bi∑
j sj
are bounded by a constant that does not grow with market
size. We will use the helpful assumption that v↓ := minij vij > 0.
First we show that each utility price βi is bounded both above and below by market constants.
Lemma 1. For any buyer i we have
∑
i′ Bi′
(v↑)2
∑
j sj
v↓ ≤ βi ≤
∑
i′ Bi′
|K|v↓
Proof. For the lower bound: We know that the sum of payments
∑
ij βivijxij in equilibrium is
exactly
∑
i′ Bi′ so we have∑
i′
Bi′ =
∑
i′,j
xi′jβi′vi′j ≤ max
i′
βi′v
↑∑
i′,j
xi′j = max
i′
βi′v
↑∑
j
sj
which implies maxi′ βi′ ≥
∑
i′ Bi′
v↑
∑
j sj
. This shows that the price on every item is lower bounded by∑
i′ Bi′
v↑
∑
j sj
v↓; thus for i to win any items, they must have βivij ≥
∑
i′ Bi′
v↑
∑
j sj
v↓ for some item j. The
lower bound follows.
For the upper bound: We know that the sum of prices must be lower than
∑
i′ Bi′ . We can thus
deduce that
∑
k βi maxj∈k vij ≤
∑
i′ Bi′ , otherwise there exists a single item from each group such
that the sum of payments on just a single unit of each of those items sums to more than the total
amount of budget in the market. It follows that βi ≤
∑
i′ Bi′
|K|v↓
From the bounds in Lemma 1 we can deduce the following upper and lower bounds on utility for all i
ui = Biβ
−1
i ≤ Bi
∑
i′ Bi′
(v↑)2
∑
j sj
v↓ =: u↑i (6)
ui = Biβ
−1
i ≥ Bi
|K|v↓∑
i′ Bi′
v↓ =: u↓i (7)
We can use this lemma to also give a bound on the total amount of supply that any given buyer can be
allocated:
Lemma 2. For any buyer i we have
∑
j xij ≤ u
↑
i
v↓
Proof. This follows from the upper bound on utility in (6)
u↑i ≥ ui =
∑
j
xijvij ≥
∑
j
xijv
↓
Now we will show that for every buyer-pair we can bound their difference in utility prices based
on how similar their valuation vector is. This lemma combines with Theorem 4 to show that if
every buyer i has a large-enough set of approximate twins (such that some approximate twin is not
constrained for constraint group k), then they have a set of competitors that will force λik to zero for
each k.
Lemma 3. Let p be a set of prices such that
∑
j sjpj ≤ n, and let β be a vector of utility prices such
that every buyer i has an associated xi such that
∑
j xij(pj + λik) ≤ Bi and (4) is respected for all
xij > 0. Then we have the following multiplicative and additive bounds on utility-price differences
between buyer pairs i, i′ such that ‖vi − vi′‖∞ ≤ 
↓βi′ ≤ βi ≤ ↑βi′ , (8)
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|βi − βi′ | ≤ (↑ − 1)
∑
i′ Bi′
|Kv↓ , (9)
where ↓ = mini∗∈I,j∈J
vi∗j′
vi∗j′+
and ↑ = maxi∗∈I,j∈J
vi∗j′
vi∗j′− , with I = {i, i
′}.
Proof. We wish to bound βi in terms of βi′ . First, if βivij > βi′vi′j for all items j that i′ obtain
under β′ then i must be spending strictly more than their budget, since they would win all items
that i′ wins, and pay strictly more. Thus, there must exists some item j such that βivij ≤ βi′vi′j ,
which implies βi ≤ βi′ vi′jvi′j− . The converse argument shows that there must exist some j
′ such that
βi ≥ βi′ vij′vij′+ . We thus have the multiplicative bound
vij′
vij′ + 
βi′ ≤ βi ≤ vi
′j
vi′j − βi
′ . (10)
The additive bound follows from the multiplicative bound because (choosing i, i′ arbitrarily)
βi′ − βi ≤ ↑βi − βi ≤ (↑ − 1)βi ≤ (↑ − 1)
∑
i′ Bi′
|K|v↓ .
Note that Lemma 3 does not require supply constraints to be respected, it only requires that buyers
pay according to βivij and buy items when they bid more than the price p. Thus the lemma applies
to market equilibria, but also more broadly to allocations attained via picking the budget-exhausting
βi given prices p.
A.2 Regret bounds
Now we can show that the bounds on AMO prices from Theorem 4 lead to an approximate market
equilibrium, in the sense that the regret of each buyer is bounded.
Corollary 1. Let (x, p, λ) be the solution to (2), and let x, p be used as an approximate market
equilibrium. For any buyer i such that for every constraint group k they have an -twin ik such that∑
j∈k xikj < 1, regret is bounded by
u↑i
v↓ maxk β
−1
i
(
βvik + βik
k
v
)
. When sjn ≤ 1 for all j then
the proportional share gap is bounded by the same quantity. For the equal-budgets setting envy is
bounded by the same quantity.
Proof. We first show the result for regret. For any constraint group k such that λik > 0 we know
from (3) that i already bought a whole unit of their best bang-per-buck item from group k. Thus, at
best i can spend their leftover budget
∑
j xijλik on items with utility price βi or worse. Since every
item they currently buy has utility price βi or better, their regret is bounded by
β−1i
∑
j
xijλikj ≤ β−1i
∑
k
∑
j∈k
xij(βvik + 
k
vβik) ≤
u↑
v↓
max
k
β−1i
(
βvik + βik
k
v
)
.
The first inequality follows from Theorem 4. The second inequality follows by taking the max over
terms in parentheses and using Lemma 2 to bound
∑
k,j∈k xij .
To show the proportional share result, note that a demand solution for buyer i receives at least the
proportional share; since
∑
j sjpj ≤
∑
i′ Bi′ and
sj
n ≤ 1 buyer i can buy sjn of each item and be
guaranteed to satisfy both the AMO and budget constraints. But weknow from the bound on regret
that buyer i receives a bundle that is within the stated distance to a demand solution, and thus the
bound on the proportional share gap follows.
To show the result for envy, simply note that a demand solution has zero envy when budgets are equal.
Since our current solution satisfies the stated bound to a demand solution, the envy must be bounded
by the same quantity.
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The above bound on envy uses the observation that in market equilibrium buyers get an allocation
from their demand set, and for equal budgets this means that they must weakly prefer their own
allocation. In our experiments that we show later, we find that there is no envy, even when regret is
non-negligible. That may be due to the observation that envy can be bounded by the weakly stronger
statement
Envyi ≤
∑
k
β−1i
(
βvik + βik
k
v
)−min
i′
vi · (x∗ − xi′)
where x∗ is a demand allocation for buyer i. This statement shows that if i strictly prefers their
demand allocation to the current allocation of others, then that non-zero difference cancels out some
of the error due to not getting an allocation from their demand set.
Corollary 1 has a dependence on the utility prices βi, βik , but we know from Lemma 3 that this
dependence can be removed. These facts imply Theorem 1.
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We will show a slightly more general version of Theorem 1 which holds for constraints groups rather
just the AMO setting. Let smax = maxk∈K
∑
j∈k sj .
Proof. Let δ ≥ 0 be some desired approximate equilibrium. Since every buyer has at least smax + 1
-twins we have that for each buyer and constraint group k there is at least one -twin for whom
constraint k is not binding. By Corollary 1 we then have that the regret of buyer i is bounded by
u↑i
v↓
max
k
β−1i
(
βvik + βi′
k
v
) ≤ u↑i
v↓
max
k
(v↑)2
∑
j sj∑
i′ Bi′
(
βvik +
∑
i′ Bi′
|K|v↓ 
)
where the inequality follows by Lemma 1. Now we can apply Lemma 3 to bound this by
u↑i
v↓
max
k
(v↑)2
∑
j sj∑
i′ Bi′
(
(↑ − 1)
∑
i′ Bi′
|Kv↓ vik +
∑
i′ Bi′
|K|v↓ 
)
where ↑ = maxi′∈I,j∈J
vi′j′
vi′j′− , where I is the set of -twins for i. For a sufficiently small  this
expression will be less than δ.
A.3 Large-market results
We will investigate the low-rank market setting from Section 3.1. Armed with Corollary 1 we know
that if every buyer has greater than maxj sj + 1 = s + 1 approximate twins then their regret is
bounded by a market-size independent constant that only depends on how similar their approximate
twins are. Thus, we may take a discretization of the low-rank spaces Θ,Ψ into a finite set of bins
(this can also be thought of as a gridding, with each bin corresponding to a hypercube in the gridding).
For each bin, we will consider any pair of buyers whose types θi, θi′ belong to the same bin to
be approximate twins. Let Θ′ be the set of types corresponding to some bin. Since we know the
maximum possible distance between types in Θ′ we get an upper bound on valuation differences
of the form ‖vi − vi′‖∞ ≤ maxθ,θ′∈Θ′ maxψ∈Ψ ‖ψ · (θ − θ′)‖∞. Since the low-rank spaces are
compact this is bounded by a constant that depends on the bin size. We may make our discretization
arbitrarily fine, and as the discretization gets finer we get tighter and tighter bounds on β and kv
for pairs of buyers that share a bin. For a sufficiently fine discretization we can then sample larger
and larger markets; for some sufficiently large market each bin has at least s+ 1 buyers in it with
exponentially high likelihood, which we show below for completeness.
We can think of such a binning as a multinomial distribution where each variable in the multinomial
distribution corresponds to a bin in the gridding.
Lemma 4. Let x1, . . . , xK be random variables denoting the number of balls in each of K bins,
with balls distributed according to a multinomial distribution with bin-probabilities γ1, . . . , γK . The
probability that bin i has less than Exic balls can be bounded as
P
(
xi ≤ Exi
c
)
≤ exp
(
−2nγ2i
(
c− 1
c
)2)
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The probability that any bin has less than Exic balls can be bounded with a union bound as
P
(
∃i : xi ≤ Exi
c
)
≤ K exp
(
−2nmin
i
γ2i
(
c− 1
c
)2)
≤ exp
(
log(K)− 2nmin
i
γ2i
(
c− 1
c
)2)
Proof. First we note that the expected number of balls in bin i, E(xi), can be viewed as a sum of
indicator random variables, and thus E(xi) = nγi. Thus having only Exic ball in bin i means that xi
deviates from its mean by Exi(1− 1c ). Now we can apply Hoeffding’s inequality to obtain the first
result:
P
(
xi ≤ Exi
c
)
≤ exp(−2(nγi(1− 1
c
))2/n)
To obtain the second result we can simply use a union bound based on the first result.
Thus, in low-rank markets every buyer has a large set of approximate twins, and thus the conditions
in Lemma 3 are satisfied for a large group of buyers. Simultaneously, in this market model the supply
of each item remains bounded by a constant, and so for any buyer i and constraint group k, there
must exist an approximate twin i′ such that they have
∑
j xij < 1. It now follows from Corollary 1
that in large low-rank markets solutions to AMO-EG are approximate market equilibria in the sense
that the regret of each buyer goes to zero almost surely as the market gets large.
A.3.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. By Theorem 1 there exists an  such that when every buyer has s + 1 -twins then
(xAMO, pAMO) is a δ-approximate CEEI. Now consider a discretization of the buyer type space into
regions such that for each region any pair of types within that region are guaranteed to be -twins.
Such a discretization is guaranteed to exist due to the type space being of fixed finite dimension
d and compact. But then we can apply Lemma 4 to get that the probability of having each region
contain less than half its expected number of buyers decreases exponentially in market size. Thus
for a sufficiently large market each buyer has a constant fraction of n -approximate twins with
exponentially-high likelihood in market size. In particular, we may pick n such that the probability is
at least δ.
B IC in the large results
In this section we will show that the mechanism resulting from using the solutions to EG and AMO-
EG for allocation are both strategy-proof in the large (SP-L) for the low-rank setting. This notion
of strategyproofness was introduced by Azevedo and Budish (2018) as a way to show that some
mechanisms become approximately incentive compatible (IC) as the market gets large, even if they
are not IC in general. Intuitively speaking, the requirement is that for any strategy profile (i.e. a
mapping from type to reported type) such that the resulting reported-type distribution has full support
and , there exists a sufficiently large market such that every buyer can gain at most  by misreporting.
Our SPL proof will consist of four steps. First, we show a certain monotonicity condition on the
β variables in AMO-EG. Secondly, we show that each price becomes lower bounded by a market-
size-independent constant with high probability. Thirdly, using the monotonicity result we show that
each buyer can have only a negligible effect on price with high probability. Finally, we use this to
conclude that each buyer cannot change their utility by much.
We now show a monotonicity condition on β in the at-most-one setting. In particular, we will interpret
the utility prices β as pacing multipliers in an allocation model that uses auctions. We will show that
taking the element-wise maximum over two budget-feasible β, β′ retains feasibility in this setting.
Similar results were previously shown for the standard EG model (Peysakhovich and Kroer, 2019),
and originally shown for a quasi-linear model that explicitly uses auctions (Conitzer et al., 2019).
Definition 5 (Auction allocation via paced bids). For a given β, paced auction allocation sets each
price pj to the sj’th highest bid, and sets xij = 1 if βivij is among the sj highest bids (for i
tied for sj’th we allow fractional allocation). Set λij = βivij − pj . Utility prices β are budget-
feasible pacing multipliers (BFPM) if the corresponding x, p, λ leads to an allocation such that∑
j xij(pj + λij) ≤ Bi for all buyers i.
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Proposition 1. The utility prices β satisfy the following monotonicity condition in the AMO-EG
setting. If β, β′ are both budget-feasible under paced auction allocation then β+i = max(βiβ
′
i) is
budget-feasible.
Proof. Assume WLOG that βi attains the maximum for i under β+. Then i pays the same price
βivij for any item they win under β+. Now let x+ij = xij if i is still among the top sj bids. If i is no
longer among the top sj bids then x+ij = 0. Note that i cannot be among the top sj bids for any item
j under β+ if they were not among the top sj under β, since the bids of i remain the same, and every
other bid weakly increased. Thus, i gets an allocation x+i ≤ xi, and since their personalized price
pj + λij stays the same, i must remain budget feasible.
Proposition 1 also shows that the maximal BFPM is unique, since they come from a compact space
(by Lemma 1).
Second, we show that a vector of utility prices is the AMO-EG solution β if and only if it is the
pointwise maximal BFPM (there is a single pointwise maximal BFPM by compactness of utility
prices).
Proposition 2. A vector of utility prices β is a solution to AMO-EG if and only if β equals the
pointwise max of β and β′ for all BFPM β′.
Proof. First, let β be the utility prices associated with a solution (x, p) to AMO-EG. We may assume
that pj equals the least bid βivij such that xij > 0, since otherwise we may increase pj until this is
true, while lowering all λi′j by the corresponding amount; this retains optimality. By 3 and 4 we
have that only “winning” bids have xij > 0. Now assume that β were not maximal, then there exists
β′ s.t. β′i > βi for some i. Taking the pointwise max of β
′ and β would then yield a new BFPM, but
then spending went strictly up for at least one buyer, which is a contradiction since 5 guarantees that
each buyer spends their budget exactly at β. This shows the only if direction.
We have that a solution β associated with AMO-EG is maximal. But by uniqueness of the maximal
BFPM and the fact that AMO-EG is guaranteed to have an optimal solution (since it is guaranteed to
be feasible), we have that β must also be the only maximal BFPM, thus showing the if direction.
Prof of Theorem 3
We prove Theorem 3 using the monotonicity of utility prices proved in Propositions 1 and 2. In
particular, we will show that in the case where a given buyer has sufficiently-many approximate
twins, the utility-price monotonicity implies that they cannot change prices by much, and cannot gain
much by tailoring their valuations to specific prices. The case where they have a small number of
approximate twins goes to zero rapidly.
Proof. Let β′ be the set of utility prices when i∗ does not participate in the market. Furthermore, set
β′i∗ equal to the value that uses the whole budget of buyer i
∗ under the paced auction allocation using
β′−i∗ . Let β be the AMO-EG solution when i
∗ reports truthfully.
Let I be the set of all buyers whose types are in some subset Θ′ ⊆ Θ where θi∗ ∈ Θ′. Let pΘ′ be the
probability of sampling a buyer from Θ′. The expected utility that i∗ gains from misreporting for a
given market size with n buyers can be decomposed as follows:
p
{
|I| ≥ npΘ′
2
}
E
[
ui
∣∣∣∣|I| ≥ npΘ′2
]
+ p
{
|I| < npΘ′
2
}
E
[
ui
∣∣∣∣|I| < npΘ′2
]
.
From Lemma 4 we know that the second term converges exponentially quickly to zero as the market
gets large, and so even when i∗ receives all items the contribution from this term converges to zero.
Thus we just need to show that the first term converges to zero.
Let  = maxi,i′∈I,j∈J |vij − vi′j |. Now consider any i ∈ I. We wish to bound βi in terms of βi∗ .
The multiplicative bound (8) applies because  satisfies the condition of Lemma 3. We thus have for
all i ∈ I
↓βi∗ ≤ βi ≤ ↑βi∗ . (11)
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Now let α = βi∗β′
i∗
, by monotonicity α ≥ 1. Applying (11) to β we then have βi ≥ ↓βi∗ ≥ α↓β′i∗ .
The total increase in payments (where payments include p and λ) can thus be lower bounded based
on increases over I as follows
Bi = 1 =
∑
i,j
xij(pj + λij)−
∑
i,j
x′ij(p
′
j + λ
′
ij) ≥
∑
i∈I,j
xij(βivij − β′ivij) (12)
≥
∑
i∈I,j
xij(α
↓β′i∗vij − ↑β′i∗vij) (13)
= β′i∗
∑
i∈I,j
xijvij(α
↓ − ↑) (14)
≥ (α↓ − ↑)β′i∗ |I|
kNv↓
N
(15)
= (α↓ − ↑)β′i∗ |I|kv↓. (16)
The first inequality follows because prices are monotonically increasing, and we know that for any
j s.t. xij > 0 for some i ∈ I we have that either 1) i is winning at least xij of j under β in which
case the price increase on xij is exactly as stated, or i is not winning xij under βi, in which case
βivij ≤ pj , and so someone else is paying at least βivij for the fraction xij of j. The second
inequality follows from (10). The third inequality follows from our utility lower bound (7) adapted to
the low rank AMO setting.
It follows that the the utility price increase α can be bounded as
α↓ − ↑ ≤ 1
β′i∗ |I|kv↓
.⇔ α ≤ 1
↓β′i∗ |I|kv↓
+
↑
↓
.
We know that βi∗ is bounded from below independent of market size as per Lemma 1.
For any particular Θ′, the expected size of the corresponding set I grows linearly in market size, and
thus the likelihood that a constant fraction of the expected size is not reached decreases exponentially
in market size, as shown in Lemma 4. It follows that for any α > 
↑
↓ it gets driven to α ≤ 
↑
↓ as the
market gets large. But we are free to pick our bounding low-rank set Θ′ as small as we wish around
θi, and thus we can make 
↑
↓ arbitrarily small by picking a sufficiently-small Θ
′.
The above shows that in the case where |I| ≥ npΘ′2 , as the market gets large i∗ cannot improve their
utility by manipulating prices and then buying according to an optimal single utility price that decides
their bids. It remains to show that when |I| ≥ npΘ′2 the difference between the utility of buying at an
optimal single utility price, versus manipulating individual valuations such that i∗ can buy at prices p,
is small. But we already know from Corollary 1 that each buyer i ∈ I, i 6= i∗ has bounded regret
under β′, since |I| ≥ npΘ′2 guarantees that the corollary applies for n > 2snpΘ′ . Furthermore, since
the utilities vi, vi∗ satisfy ‖vi − vi∗‖∞ ≤  and the `1 length of the allocation vectors xi, xi∗ are
bounded by u
↑
i
v↓ by Lemma 2, we know that buyer i
∗ prefers their best allocation under β′ over that of
buyer i by at most 2u
↑
i
v↓ . Combining these bounds we find that under the prices from β
′, buyer i∗ can
at most improve their utility by buying at prices p, as opposed to via a single utility-price, by
2
u↑i
v↓
+
u↑i
v↓
max
k
β−1i (βvik + βi′) .
Since  and β both get smaller as we make Θ′ smaller we get that this gain can be made arbitrarily
small by picking Θ′ sufficiently small, and picking a correspondingly-large n such that |I| ≥
npΘ′
2 .
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